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ABSTRACT 
This paper primarily addresses the issue of identifying all possible levels of digital anonymity, thereby 
allowing electronic services and mechanisms to be categorised. For this purpose, we sophisticate the 
generic idea of anonymity and, filling a niche in the field, bring the scope of trust into the focus of 
categorisation. One major concern of our work is to propose a novel and universal taxonomy which 
enables a dynamic, trust-based comparison between systems at an abstract level. On the other hand, 
our contribution intentionally does not offer an alternative to anonymity metrics, but neither is it 
concerned with methods of anonymous data retrieval (cf. data-mining techniques). However, for 
ease of comprehension, it provides a systematic 'application manual' and also presents a lucid 
overview of the correspondence between the current and related taxonomies. Additionally, as a 
generalisation of group signatures, we introduce the notion of group schemes. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Following the convention, unless otherwise stated, we adopt Köhntopp and Pfitzmann’s terminology 
[11] in the sequel. For ease of usage, we generally refer to the subject of categorisation as anonymity 
service (or simply service), irrespective of the underlying protocol1 or method, the implementing 
apparatus, or the concrete environment. Still, any kind of application or mechanism can equally well 
be classified according to the model to be proposed. 
Etymologically, the term 'anonymity' originates from the Greek word 'anonymia', simply meaning 
namelessness. However, that ancient significance has been extended in every sense since the 
Hellenic era. As an interdisciplinary phenomenon [17] and being mostly used in the context of 
personal liberty, it now affects our everyday interactions in commerce, in communication, in polling 
etc. Therefore, it has, in the meantime, taken on many different aspects as well as diverse 
interpretations. On the other hand, a number of related terms (e.g. identity, pseudonymity, or 
privacy) have come to exist alongside anonymity throughout the centuries – facilitating refinement 
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 By the term 'protocol' we mean concrete cryptographic protocols, meanwhile 'scheme' is used to refer to 
some protocol scheme. 
of the original concept. Having considered all these facts, it is no wonder that they have led to some 
semantic ambiguity about anonymity. To resolve this inconsistency, we further specify the subject of 
investigation. 
First, we must determine the type of anonymity service to be concerned with. As pointed out by 
Díaz et al. [14], there should be made a distinction between data and connection anonymity. While 
data anonymity is about de-identifying some data, i.e. filtering any personal identifying information 
out of the data (thereby limiting identity linkage), connection anonymity addresses the issue of 
concealing identities during interaction (incl. the actual data transfer). Since de-identification is 
predominantly carried out on data sets, it forms the central concern of privacy-preserving data 
mining (q.v. [12, 13]). From this point on, we strictly confine the discussion to services providing 
connection anonymity. 
Second, it is also crucial to define the type of anonymity that we shall henceforth concentrate on. 
According to [20], there are three types here to be allowed for. As for environmental anonymity, 
being determined by external factors (incl. the number and diversity of users) and prior knowledge, 
its level may vary from situation to situation – even in relation to the same anonymity service. Hence, 
it cannot be used as a base for our scheme of classification.2 Meanwhile, procedural anonymity of a 
service deals with the underlying protocol (or method) itself and, as such, depends merely on 
intrinsic qualities.  Consequently, it can be examined through the design of the system and can thus 
be well adapted to our purpose. Given that the third kind, called content-based anonymity, is about 
mitigating contextual (i.e. source-related) clues in the transferred data, and thus practically concerns 
only messaging applications, it can be excluded from our investigation too – for being insignificant for 
a generic study. All things considered, to construct an abstract categorisation model, it suffices to 
deal merely with procedural anonymity. 
To make it crystal clear, our goal is to present a universally applicable model that, being based 
solely on scheme-related characteristics, enables dynamic categorisation of services according to the 
amount of trust3 that users must place in other participants in order to remain anonymous towards 
distrusted entities. Dynamicity is to lie in the model’s relativity to two investigative parameters: the 
user role to be observed and the set of distrusted entities. Furthermore, by providing category-level 
requirement analyses, we shall be able to make the desired model useful to be considered for the 
design of service schemes, in order for them to ensure a predetermined level of anonymity. 
The remaining parts of the paper are organised as follows. Particularising some notable 
contributions, the succeeding section discusses related work. Afterwards, Section 3 defines 
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 As mentioned before, our contribution is not meant for measuring the degree of anonymity (cf. [14,15]). 
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 associating higher levels with potentially less distrust 
anonymity properties, establishes the general principles of our approach, and clarifies terminological 
questions. Section 4, then, introduces our 5-class categorisation model, describing all corresponding 
anonymity levels and design requirements in detail. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a concise 
summary of our findings and exhibits the connection between extant taxonomies and the one to be 
proposed. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Although the idea of identifying the levels of anonymity was pioneered by Flinn and Maurer as early 
as 1995, we may ascertain that this very first approach [16] suffices to focus on the context of 
"networked computer systems", without separating anonymity services from the concrete 
applications and their settings. Since this global perspective on anonymity enables only situation-
dependent examinations to be made, the proposed model cannot be used as a universal means for 
comparing plain anonymity services. Instead, it was primarily intended to describe all distinct levels 
of anonymity – involving tangential discussion on implementation issues and requirements. Finally, 
they concluded by discerning five separate classes. 
Following Flinn and Maurer’s inaugural investigation, another essential artefact [11], among the 
few closely-related papers, was published in 2001. In the light of its conventionally-used 
nomenclature, it is now undisputed that they were Köhntopp and Pfitzmann who established the 
[terminological] building blocks of the field. The most elementary term is pseudonymity, which is 
introduced to cover the entire spectrum between direct accountability and complete 
unaccountability (i.e. anonymity in their usage). Contrarily, diverging from Köhntopp and Pfitzmann’s 
approach, our concept of anonymity is identical to that of pseudonymity in their usage (see Section 
4). Apart from defining the primitives and standardising the terminology, they also introduced a two-
dimensional categorisation of pseudonyms4. One dimension classifies pseudonyms according to the 
context that they are used in. Among these five classes, we make no distinction between person and 
relationship pseudonyms, nor between role and role-relationship pseudonyms. Henceforward, any 
persistent pseudonym linkable to a single individual shall simply be referred to as a pseudonym. As 
for role-related pseudonyms, they fall within the category of group schemes (see Section 3). At the 
same time, there are three categories5 along the other dimension, each of which can be directly 
associated with a particular level of anonymity (see Section 5). 
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 Pseudonyms are defined as unique identifiers of subjects (or sets of subjects) and, as such, are suitable to be 
used to authenticate the holder and their items of interest (e.g. messages, events, actions). 
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 Based on the public’s initial knowledge about individual–pseudonym associations, they discerned the 
following types: public, initially non-public, and initially unlinkable pseudonyms. 
Still in 2001, Seys et al. made a second attempt [19] to systematically identify the different types 
of anonymity. After showing that identifiability, linkability, and traceability (see Section 3) are, jointly, 
not only sensible but also ideal determiners of anonymity, they opted to define categories in terms of 
these, functionally critical properties. Notwithstanding that five (four practically distinct) types could 
thereby be recognised, they by themselves, being insufficient to cover all aspects of anonymity, 
cannot be uniquely associated with specific levels. Therefore, Seys et al. introduced additional 
properties (conditionality and durability), orthogonal to the defining ones, with the help of which the 
derived types may be classified according to their strength of anonymity (see Section 5). 
The relationships between the above taxonomies are illustrated, in conjunction with a complete 
enumeration of all potential levels of anonymity (incl. our contribution), in tabular form in Section 5. 
3. PRELIMINARIES 
The aforementioned inconsistency (q.v. Section 1) among definitions of anonymity, which is 
presumably induced by the term’s diffuse meaning and ubiquitous use, perhaps calls for a higher 
degree of sophistication. Accordingly, resting upon a trust-oriented differentiation, we herein 
identify each distinct level of anonymity. This classification does not only allow anonymity services to 
be categorised, but also affords us informal class definitions. Besides, by adopting a pragmatic 
approach based on narrowing the scope of trust (see Section 4 for details), we are also able to 
provide some analytical descriptions of the derived classes. Before proceeding to the actual 
taxonomy, we must, however, clarify some terminological and conceptual questions in order that 
one can properly apply the model. 
Anonymity Properties 
Similarly to [19], we introduce some analytical properties in order to facilitate characterisation of 
anonymity levels. We note that certain definitions specified hereunder are borrowed from earlier 
contributions. 
"Identifiability is the possibility to know the real identity of some party in the system by means of 
actual data exchanged in the system." [19] 
"Traceability is the ability to obtain information about the communicating parties by observing 
the communication context (e.g. via the IP address)." [21] 
"Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOI) means that within this system, these items are 
no more and no less related than they are related with respect to the a-priori knowledge." [11] 
Although there are situations where it is sensible to distinguish6 between identifiability and 
traceability, the two terms can as well be regarded identical in terms of the degree of anonymity; viz. 
the way by which that identity information is obtained may be indifferent. Therefore, we introduce 
the generalised concept of recognisability as the possibility of 'observing' any personally identifiable 
information (see next subsection) about individuals, irrespective of the context of observation. Nota 
bene, we consider personally identifiable information to be observable if it is both accessible and 
interpretable, most notably not irreversibly obfuscated (e.g. hashed). At the same time, it might still 
be encoded or encrypted, provided that recoverability requirements are fulfilled, i.e. 
encoding/encryption mechanisms are identifiable or pre-specified, decryption keys are available etc. 
Having introduced the above property, we let ourselves concentrate on the fact whether or not 
these individuals are recognisable, according as there is the possibility of such observation or not. 
Incidentally, recognisability of individuals implies that they may potentially become accountable for 
their action. As a remark, we shall still use the more specific terms (identifiability or traceability) to 
explicitly describe recognisability when occasion requires. 
By definition, identifiability and traceability and recognisability can all describe anonymity sharing 
the same7 implicit subject: the individual. Meanwhile, unlinkability concerns solely IOIs (if not 
otherwise specified). These, still, do not mean that we cannot talk about traceability (or 
identifiability) of IOIs or, even, unlinkability between individuals and IOIs – however, in such usages, 
one should always explicate the desired subject. As regards unidentifiability, untraceability, 
unrecognisability, and linkability; since their definitions may straightforwardly be deduced from 
those of the opposite terms, we do not elaborate on them. To exemplify the connections between 
these terms, let us take some trivial implications: traceable IOIs, which presume observable 
personally identifiable information, imply linkability between individuals and IOIs, which, in turn, 
implies individual accountability. Moreover, identifiability, which is a possible source of 
recognisability, must of necessity proceed from traceable IOIs too. Also trivially, recognisability or, in 
other words, observability8 of PII entails linkability. 
Notwithstanding that most people would like to be unrecognisable in the electronic world, there 
is a strong conflict of interests over digital unrecognisability. On the one hand, all individuals should 
be enabled to hide their identities, whilst fraudsters should, on the other hand, be prevented from 
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 "With respect to identifiability, identity information is acquired through the actual data communicated in the 
system; traceability focuses on the context of the communication to get this information." [21] 
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 Literally speaking, it is apparently the communication (not the individual) which can be traceable; however 
the property of traceability, analogously to identifiability, tells us about the recognisability of the individual. 
8
 To avoid inconsistency with [11], if possible, we shall henceforth shun the use of the term 'observability'. 
dodging responsibility for their actions. This conflict between privacy concerns and legal9 
accountability can, however, be reconciled (see limited anonymity). In contrast to unrecognisability, 
unlinkability is not crucially required to ensure anonymity. Still, it might increase the sense of security 
of the user, especially when they are subject to recognisability. Nevertheless, linkability, per se, does 
not directly affect privacy concerns. We observe that there are services which, owing to their intrinsic 
characteristics, essentially preclude unlinkability (see Subsection 'Pseudonymity'). 
Given that the degree to which anonymity properties are preserved may by design be limited, 
according as they can or cannot be violated eligibly (see Subsection 'Scope of Trust'), we should 
somehow be able to indicate such conditionality. Appropriately, when individuals may under no 
circumstances become recognised, we regard them as unconditionally unrecognisable, and say that 
unrecognisability is completely preserved.10 Otherwise, if unrecognisability can eligibly be violated 
(i.e. it is conditional), individuals are said to be conditionally unrecognisable. Finally, in the case of 
unauthorised recognisability, we regard unrecognisability as void. We can likewise scrutinise 
conditionality in connection with providing recognisability, (un)traceability, (un)identifiability, 
(un)accountability, (un)linkability, or (un)observability of PII. This qualification of security properties 
allows for a more sophisticated analysis of the levels of anonymity. 
Remark. Conditional unrecognisability can indicate that some designated participant (q.v. Subsection 
'Scope of Trust'), being allowed to trace or link IOIs, may violate complete unrecognisability. On the 
other hand, it can either imply that identities may be made subject to recognition unintentionally, i.e. 
when it is precipitated by a fraudulent act. Equally, the same applies to conditional unlinkability. (see 
limited anonymity) 
Personally Identifiable Information 
Another term that should be brought into central focus is personally identifiable information, PII for 
short. For the purpose of the study, we define PII as information sufficient to uniquely identify, or 
trace to, a specific individual or, alternatively, a piece of such information. In consequence, PII is 
simply meant to ensure identifiability of individuals. Examples of PII include11, but are not limited to, 
names (such as a full name, a mother‘s maiden name, or an alias), personal identification numbers 
(such as a national identification number, a passport number, a driver’s license number, a taxpayer 
identification number, a patient identification number, a financial account number, or credit card 
number), address information (such as a street or email address), asset information (such as an IP or 
MAC address), telephone numbers, personal characteristics (such as a facial image or a biometric 
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 In some cases, it might suffice to provide merely informal accountability. 
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 The adjectives 'complete' and 'unconditional' are interchangeably used, and so are their derivatives. 
11
 according to the recommendations of the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology [22] 
identifier), information identifying a private property (such as a vehicle registration number or a title 
number), and any information about an individual that is linkable to one of the above (incl. date of 
birth, place of birth, and geographical indicators). 
In the following of this subsection, we introduce a purely pragmatic classification of PII types. To 
this, let us concentrate on resolvability, i.e. the difficulty of tracing PII to the respective individuals in 
terms of the accessibility of the data set containing the given PII associations, the so-called PII 
records. Since services applying distinct types of PII may call for distinct degrees of user confidence 
(see Section 4), we find it reasonable to differentiate between directly resolvable (e.g. most landline 
telephone numbers), indirectly resolvable (e.g. bank account number), and unresolvable (e.g. DNA 
fingerprints) PII. For ease of usage, the former two types are respectively referred to as direct and 
indirect PII. While direct PII requires no external assistance to be traced to the respective individual, 
in the case of indirect PII, identification may only be carried out with the involvement of a third party 
having access to the given PII record. By contrast, ensuring against personal recognisability, 
unresolvable PII must not be traceable to anyone – with the possible exception of the individual 
themself. In addition, PII may also classify legal accountability as direct or indirect, according as the 
authorities do or do not need a third party to bring fraudsters to account. One can easily ascertain 
that, unless managed by some authority, indirect PII straightforwardly entails indirect accountability. 
Furthermore, we may equally establish a similar correlation in the direct case, viz. public disclosure of 
direct PII likewise implies direct accountability. Nevertheless, the use of direct (or indirect) PII, per se, 
does not definitely indicate direct (or indirect) accountability. On the other hand, applying solely 
unresolvable PII implies unaccountability with no proviso. 
Remarks. In effect, any PII can be made directly available to the public by listing the corresponding 
PII records in a public directory. Hence, the above characterisation enables only temporal 
classification of PII data, viz. any initially indirect (or unresolvable) PII can become directly resolvable 
(or indirectly resolvable) over time. Although these ruminations are, apparently, highly dependent on 
what we regard as public (see Subsection 'Scope of Trust'), some types are, by nature, readily 
available (or initially unavailable) – irrespective of the concrete setting. 
Pseudonymity 
As distinct from [11], where the whole continuum between direct accountability and complete 
unaccountability is called pseudonymity, we introduce a more specific usage thereof. Be they in a 
peer-to-peer or in a client-server environment, services (esp. in user-adaptive systems [18]) often 
require the use of pseudonyms to be able to maintain, by observing and personalising user 
interactions, long-term relationships between entities. Notwithstanding that (persistent) 
pseudonyms may therefore be advantageous for user modelling, they impede realisation of 
unlinkability. One might, however, consider introducing user-determined (i.e. initially unlinkable) 
pseudonyms as means of providing personal unrecognisability and thus unaccountability – in 
addition to linkability. Note that each pseudonym can be correlated with either type of PII: public 
pseudonyms class as direct PII, whereas initially non-public and initially unlinkable pseudonyms may 
respectively be regarded as indirect and unresolvable PII. Furthermore, any PII that is per se 
appropriate for uniquely indentifying an individual (within a given anonymity set) may potentially be 
used as, or be translated into (e.g. via encoding), a pseudonym. 
Although the concept of PII subsumes pseudonymity, they each represent different aspects of 
identification. While a pseudonym is one single identifier (i.e. a string of characters) associated to an 
individual, PII may refer to any person-specific knowledge, fact, or data.12 Therefore, bringing PII into 
the focus of examination allows for a more abstract approach to scrutinising identity leakage, most 
notably it lets us merge identifiability and traceability (q.v. Subsection 'Anonymity Properties'). 
Additionally, a public or initially non-public pseudonym should of necessity be associated with PII 
representing the holder, in order for accountability to be ensured.13 Such associated PII must thus be 
sufficient to uniquely identify a single individual. 
Remark. As an ancillary to [11], we observe that not every type of initially unlinkable pseudonym is 
suitable to perfectly preclude accountability; viz. personal characteristics, being inalienable and 
tamper-proof, may support allegations. Contrarily, other types of initially unlinkable pseudonyms, 
come they from asset-specific identifiers (e.g. MAC addresses) or be they actually defined by the user 
themself (e.g. non-public email addresses), do indeed serve repudiation. 
Investigative Principles 
Prior to each anonymity analysis, we, initially, need to decide from which party’s viewpoint we wish 
to investigate the concrete service. Let us regard to this party as the observee. By 'party', we mean to 
refer to, nota bene, a general representative of a participant role. Obviously, the anonymity set is 
thus comprised of all potential members of the same role. 
Remark. By contrast with [19], we do not examine anonymity towards some particular party. Rather, 
each examination must be carried out towards all distrusted entities (see Subsection 'Scope of 
Trust'). 
As to the categorisation, the basic principles to be applied are as follows. If some direct PII of the 
observee is temporarily or permanently observable, then the service under scrutiny provides no 
anonymity for them and thus comes under the lowest-level category (see void anonymity). Generally 
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put, if it exhibits characteristics that would imply a lower level of anonymity as well as such that 
would indicate a higher one, then it clearly falls into the lower class. More simply put, services should 
be placed in the lowest class of those under consideration, i.e. whose definitions are satisfied. We 
refer to the preceding principle as the lowest level principle. 
As mentioned above, we do not distinguish between temporary and permanent leakage of PII, 
evading thereby the question of durability [19]. At the same time, investigations should always be 
confined to ordinary circumstances, i.e. neglecting situations where anonymity ceases by virtue of 
inappropriate behaviour (see limited anonymity). 
Group Schemes 
By using the term 'party' before, we do not constrain the examination to participant roles: groups, 
and thus group schemes, can also be studied from the aspect of anonymity. We call a mechanism a 
group scheme if it 1) operates on groups and 2) enables group authentication (cf. membership 
authentication [9]), i.e. suffices to verify membership (e.g. via credentials) to allow a group action to 
be performed and 3) enables authenticated members to take measures on behalf of the group and 4) 
precludes unconditional recognisability as well as unconditional linkability. The introduction of the 
notion of group schemes is motivated by the numerous alternative derivatives of Chaum’s credential 
scheme [7,8], whose most prominent members are group signatures (originally proposed by Chaum 
and van Heyst [3]). Owing to the above properties, such group-based schemes, clearly, provide group 
members with some kind of anonymity: let us call it group anonymity. They may also involve a 
dedicated, trusted member, called group manager; who is responsible for adding (and removing) 
individuals to (and from) the group and has the ability to reveal identities in disputed cases. We 
propose drawing distinction between 'plain' and group anonymity, for the simple reason that in the 
latter case one should exercise more caution in determining the level of anonymity – due to a few 
extra factors which, as discussed later, need to be taken into account. On the other hand, since group 
authentication guarantees unrecognisability and thus unlinkability by definition, group schemes 
obviate low-level14 anonymity. Accordingly, both untraceability and unlinkability are, inter alia, 
essential prerequisites for group signatures (as defined by Chaum and Heyst). 
Remarks. There may be situations where it is sensible, most notably for privacy-enhancing purposes, 
to incorporate a group scheme into a service. In such cases, we can determine the level of anonymity 
by investigating solely the embedded mechanism.15 The easiest (though primitive) way to provide 
group anonymity is to use role-related pseudonyms (q.v. Section 2) in conjunction with passwords. 
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 If so, the findings shall obviously relate to the viewpoint of that specific group only. 
Scope of Trust 
Another crucial issue, which is of prime focus in this work, is the question of publicity, i.e. the extent 
of exposure of individuals to recognisability. Notwithstanding that enabling people to be truly 
anonymous should entail preventing any type of PII from being observable to anyone (the observee 
apart), we cannot have such control over directly resolvable, nor over unresolvable PII – as they are 
unconditionally observable or, respectively, unobservable. In consequence, we shall henceforth 
concentrate predominantly on indirectly resolvable PII. As known, it is, for various reasons, not 
uncommon for an anonymity service to involve trusted third parties (TTP), who are deliberately let in 
on certain privacy-sensitive information: e.g. TTPs may be designated as group managers in group 
schemes. Such trusted entities can not only observe PII, but may also be given the exclusive privilege 
of managing PII records, all without completely compromising anonymity (see revocable anonymity). 
In addition, there are a number of occasions when it is even inevitable to expose PII. Namely, 
specific, commonly-used PII types (e.g. personal identification numbers) can equally well be 
registered and maintained by distrusted third parties (DTP), who may then inherently reveal 
identities and, thereby, break true anonymity (see apparent anonymity). 
In either case, be they trusted or distrusted, third parties should be regarded as loosely-coupled 
stakeholders of the system (see Figure 1). In addition, direct stakeholders (i.e. participants) may also 
be classified as trusted or distrusted, according as we do or do not desire to preserve 
unrecognisability towards them. Therefore, after deciding on the observee, one also needs to 
determine the set of trusted entities, the so-called trusted set. Beside the TTPs, we treat, by default, 
solely the observee16 as trusted, all other entities (incl. the public and DTPs) are consequently 
regarded as distrusted. Nonetheless, trusted sets can be extended to include further trustworthy 
participants – whilst others should be attached to the distrusted group. Afterwards, we can begin the 
investigation by discovering which entities the observee is actually forced to be subject to17 if 
wanting to remain unrecognised. Let us refer to the result of the discovery as the scope of trust. We 
note that, as an extreme case, the observee may need to rely on themself, in the sense that they 
must act honestly so as not to become accountable (see forfeitable anonymity). Once some PII is 
observable from outside the scope of the system, we consider it publicly known. 
Given that trusted stakeholders may by design be allowed to observe PII, unrecognisability and 
unlinkability should first be verified against distrusted entities (who may de facto violate them). If 
this verification fails, we regard the given property as void; otherwise, it should be reverified against 
the trusted set. We can thus have conditional or unconditional unrecognisability (or unlinkability) 
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 taken as an individual at this time 
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 due to their capability to make the observee accountable  
according to the outcome of the reverification. As, in our approach, the level of anonymity provided 
by a service is highly relative to the classification of entities, any modification in the trusted (or in the 
distrusted) set may potentially affect the result of the examination. 
Remarks. If one would demand a generic constraint on publicity, it should be formulated as follows: 
preserving true anonymity generally18 requires that resolvable PII be unobservable to any distrusted 
entity. In other words, the publicity constraint dictates that the scope of trust should be a subset of 
the trusted set. To refer to a general member of the trusted (or the distrusted) set, we use the term 
'entity'. 
In summary of the preliminaries, there are two essential parameters which need to be determined 
preparatory to investigating an anonymity service: the observee and the trusted set. The 
investigation itself, in turn, consists in discovering the scope of trust and in contrasting it with the 
trusted set, as discussed in Section 4. In accordance with what was stated above, Figure 1 illustrates 
how entities should be regarded in the course of the investigation. 
 
SYSTEM SCOPE 
the public 
distrusted  
participants 
distrusted  
third parties 
trusted  
participants 
trusted  
third parties 
observee 
DISTRUSTED SET TRUSTED SET 
1Figure 1 – A comprehensive classification of entities 
4. LEVELS OF ANONYMITY 
In the current section, we look at the classification of levels of anonymity induced by the scope of 
trust. To identify these levels, we concentrate on the recognisability of individuals, or more 
specifically on the extent to which services expose PII to observation. Clearly, in respect of a concrete 
investigation, one should confine oneself to examining solely observee-related PII. Let us keep in 
mind that accessible PII may not necessarily mean readily interpretable plaintext data: it can equally 
be encrypted or encoded on occasion. Furthermore, as observability of accessible PII is relative to 
whom it is interpretable for, one should always name this related party (to which the observee’s PII is 
observable) in conjunction – unless it is implicit or indifferent. 
Level 0 (void anonymity – VA) 
At one extreme of the scale, people are completely deprived of the possibility of obscuring their 
identity and may become directly accountable for their actions. This is the case when, violating the 
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 with one exceptional situation (see revocable anonymity) 
publicity constraint, some direct PII data are publicly observable. Accordingly, if a service, for 
example, exposes public pseudonyms (e.g. unencrypted public keys in a PKI19), it cannot be 
recognised as anonymous – at least not from the given viewpoint. As an implication of unconditional 
recognisability, void anonymity ensures (unconditional) linkability. Furthermore, the scope of trust 
involves at least one entity from outside the scope of the system. 
Remark. In the case of group anonymity a similar situation could trivially arise if the group were 
limited to either one or two members. However, such contextual matters are dealt with by 
environmental anonymity, and thus fall out of the scope of this paper. Normally, we cannot have 
group anonymity at this level. 
Level 1 (apparent anonymity – AA) 
A slightly more advanced way of providing anonymity may be the application of indirect PII, which 
makes calling individuals to account somewhat more complicated. Let us assume that, still in 
violation of the publicity constraint, these indirect PII data are observable to distrusted entities (e.g. 
to the public). Then identification can still be carried out, be that a bit more difficult, with the help of 
some third-party stakeholder20. Apparent anonymity presumes that at least one of such entities 
belongs to the distrusted set – otherwise, one should upgrade to revocable anonymity. The use of 
initially non-public pseudonyms (e.g. plain credit card numbers) provides an obvious example of this 
scenario, as long as the above visibility conditions are satisfied. As an alternative scenario of 
achieving apparent anonymity, we may even introduce direct PII data, with the proviso that they 
should be publicly unobservable, but be observable to all trusted entities and some distrusted 
participant.21 Once, apart the public, there is no distrusted entity, one should proceed to limited 
anonymity. For instances, we may take encrypted public pseudonyms. Similarly to the preceding 
level, the requirements for recognisability, and thus for linkability, are unconditionally met. 
Notwithstanding that the scope of trust again contains some distrusted entities, it excludes the 
public. 
Remark. Although group schemes do usually apply a dedicated trusted participant (namely the group 
manager), that must of necessity be trusted. Moreover, they by definition preclude unconditional 
recognisability. Consequently, group anonymity even surpasses the level of apparent anonymity. 
Level 2-3 (limited anonymity) 
Having taken into consideration the similarity between the concept of extending the trusted set and 
that of forfeiting the ability to be anonymous, the subsequent two classes are to be jointly discussed. 
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 This may be a usual participant as well as an actual TTP or DTP. 
21
 It is easy to devise schemes whereby but insiders can, by nature of their position, observe confidential data. 
Their analogy straightforwardly arises from the concepts’ common, trust-based nature, viz. in the 
former case they are the users who must place their trust in TTPs, while the latter rests upon the 
assumption that each individual inclines to obey not only the law, but also corresponding rules 
and/or policies. In any regard, both levels guarantee anonymity by a relatively narrow, limited scope 
of trust. 
- Level 2 (revocable anonymity – RA) 
As mentioned previously, PII may be known to dedicated trusted entities without abandoning high-
level anonymity. This means that, in spite of the few incidental adverse consequences, it can still be 
sensible to include trustworthy entities in the trusted set. The rationale for making such a 
compromise is that we can thus designate TTPs, or other trusted participants, to manage PII records 
so that any IOI22 can of necessity be traced back. On the downside, by involving such a so-called 
identity manager, anonymity, or more precisely unrecognisability, can only be conditionally 
preserved. Another drawback is that individuals must thus not only content themselves with limited 
anonymity, but also face the threat of identity abuse. Then, beyond the trust that must be put in 
the identity manager themself, they [the user] also need to rely on the security mechanism 
deployed by the identity manager. As discussed at apparent anonymity, unhidden indirect PII may 
promote revocable anonymity, provided that it is observable to distrusted entities, but no 
identification can be performed without involving an identity manager. Therefore, if satisfying 
these latter conditions, initially non-public pseudonyms can again exemplify the level. Another 
scenario, which can be assigned to the same scope of trust, is that we expose direct PII to trusted 
participants in such a way that it should be unobservable to distrusted entities. Once, apart the 
observee, there is no trusted entity, one should further proceed to forfeitable anonymity. As 
regards the appellation, 'revocable' flows from the following consideration. It is not difficult to 
conceive that, on valid grounds, an identity manager becomes inclined to reveal an identity to a 
third person, and thereby revokes a user’s anonymity. Such a revocation process might be 
triggered, for instance, 1) in fraud cases when the authorities appeal for an adversary’s identity or 
2) by disobedience, once some predefined rules and/or policies are violated or 3) by expiry of 
entitlement to be anonymous. Moreover, anonymity may also be revoked if an individual themself 
has an interest in revoking their identity.23 Occasionally, as suggested by the previous arguments, it 
can be not merely sensible, but also substantive to ensure revocability, and thus only conditional 
unrecognisability (unidentifiability or untraceability). All things considered, it must be beyond 
dispute that, at this level, identities are entirely subject to identity managers, thereby being 
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 e.g. confidential messages or any legal/illegal action taken by a user/adversary 
23
 Esp. when they want to be acquitted of a charge or are to be given a reward (e.g. a good mark). 
exposed to revocation. Besides, our denomination can be further justified by simplicity and 
prevalence reasons. Despite that exposing persistent PII may support linkability, we can limit the 
possibility of associating IOIs by using mutable PII (e.g. dynamic IP addresses) or by reversible 
obfuscation (after adding some random salt). In addition, applying unconcealed, initially non-public, 
transaction pseudonyms [11] can also make it a privilege of the identity manager to link IOIs – the 
latter can by no means be deprived of that capability. The scope of trust, of necessity, includes the 
observee as well as some further trusted entity (e.g. the identity manager) and comprises, at most, 
all the trusted entities. 
Remark. Note that, in group schemes, it is the group manager who may appropriately fill the role of 
the identity manager. Nonetheless, at this point, there is some difference between group-based 
and plain anonymity in connection with linkability, viz. it is by definition precluded by the former 
type. In default of a group manager, one should again consider upgrading to a higher level. 
Otherwise, this is the lowest level that a group scheme may afford. 
- Level 3 (forfeitable anonymity – FA) 
By forfeitable anonymity, individuals remain anonymous as long as policies, rules, and – not least – 
the law are followed. Upon violating any of them, the person incriminated forfeits their anonymity. 
The reasoning behind the idea of forfeiture can be backed by various realistic situations. 
Forfeitability may be beneficial for example 1) in e-payment protocols to prevent double-spending 
or 2) in turnstile systems to restrict someone’s movements to a definite area (e.g. within the 
workplace). Allowing anonymity to be subject to forfeiture may obviate inappropriate user 
behaviour by deterring individuals from committing fraud or from being disobedient. The 
distinction drawn between revocable24 and forfeitable25 anonymity comes from the corresponding 
term definitions [at footnotes]. Accordingly, revocability requires a participant [identity manager] 
who is responsible for revocation; whereas forfeitability suffices to require an event-driven 
forfeiture mechanism26, as a result of which (direct or indirect) user PII gets observable, and 
adversaries can become known. Such a typical triggering event would be, e.g., an attempt at 
double-spending an e-cash coin. Given that, normally, no resolvable PII data are observable, 
unidentifiability is conditional solely on obedience. The fact, however, remains that IOIs must be 
able to be traced back after forfeiture; which, in turn, implies that some (interpretable) resolvable 
PII should be attached to them.27 Since third parties can legitimately be obliged to reveal identities 
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 revoke ― to annul by recalling or taking back (Merriam-Webster) 
25
 forfeit ― to lose or lose the right to especially by some error, offense, or crime (ibid.) 
26
 Accountability can principally based on a cut-and-choose technique or a zero-knowledge proof (introduced in 
[4,5] respectively), as demonstrated by L. Law et al in [6]. 
27
 Introducing unresolvable PII would, here, be unreasonable. 
in fraud cases, indirect PII may as well come into consideration as direct one. In consequence, 
public and initially non-public pseudonyms, though not specifically intended for that, might equally 
well be introduced for identification purposes (provided that they are inaccessible and/or 
uninterpretable until fraud occurs). Moreover, initially unlinkable pseudonyms may also be applied 
(in addition or solo) to guarantee unconditional linkability. For such purpose, unresolvable PII might 
thus be introduced and even be exposed to observation.28 At the same time, as no resolvable PII 
can be obtained by observing the communication context, traceability cannot come into 
consideration. The scope of trust, at most, contains the observee. 
Remark. In accordance with the preceding class definition [revocable anonymity] as well as with 
the lowest level principle, existence of identity managers precludes forfeitable anonymity. Not to 
mention that involving such a trusted entity would even make any forfeiture strategy useless (as 
identities could simply be revoked).  
Be it revocable or forfeitable, limited anonymity can not only prevent abuse, but also assure 
beneficent individuals (and even the authorities) that adversaries can potentially be called to 
account, whilst personal rights are respected. All aspects considered, limited anonymity seems to be 
the best compromise between privacy concerns and accountability. 
Remark. In need of a universal expression for the process of discontinuing anonymity, one may 
conventionally use de-anonymisation – regardless of the concrete level of limited anonymity. It must 
also be noted that elsewhere in the literature 'revocation' and derived terms are predominantly used 
in a broader sense, namely as a synonym for de-anonymisation. 
Level 4 (unconditional anonymity – UA) 
At the other extreme of the anonymity spectrum (opposite to direct accountability), having made 
sure that none of the previous class definitions is satisfied, one may recognise a service as 
unconditionally anonymous. Despite the fact that, being the most advanced way of protecting 
privacy, unconditional anonymity minimises information leakage, it does not completely exclude the 
possibility of using PII. Namely, unresolvable PII may be made observable without enabling personal 
recognition to be performed – e.g. in order for user interactions to be personalised. As a 
consequence, we may apply initially unlinkable pseudonyms (e.g. hashed IP addresses) to maintain 
relationships in user-adaptive systems. Beyond complete unidentifiability, unconditional anonymity 
as well implies complete untraceability (q.v. [7]). However, the question of linkability, being 
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 In default of observable pseudonyms, linkability is, though conditionally, still ensured (due to identifiability). 
dependent on the use of PII, remains undecided29 (see Table 2). Since users do not have to trust 
anyone so as to avoid accountability, the scope of trust contains no entities. 
Remarks. One may also achieve unconditional anonymity by introducing non-persistent (still initially 
unlinkable), transaction pseudonyms. Being different from transaction to transaction, this type, in 
contrast to the persistent one, does not support linkability. Moreover, as pointed out by Köhntopp 
and Pfitzmann [11], transaction pseudonyms (if used exactly once) can generate the same degree of 
anonymity as if there were no pseudonym at all. 
Summary 
Table 1 and Table 2 comprehensively summarise all implications of what has been said in this section. 
As a remark: by defining a property as 'void', we indicate that it is just the inverse which is satisfied 
(e.g. void recognisability implies unrecognisability). 
LEVEL 
TYPE OF  
ANONYMITY 
SCOPE OF TRUST RECOGNISABILITY 
DEG. ABBR. LOWER BOUND MAX. EXT. TYPE SOURCE 
0 VA void system scope – unconditional identifiability or traceability 
1 AA apparent trusted set system scope unconditional identifiability or traceability 
2 RA revocable observee trusted set conditional identifiability or traceability 
3 FA forfeitable void observee conditional identifiability 
4 UA unconditional – void void none 
1Table 1 – Class-level characterisation of anonymity 
LEVEL 
TYPE OF 
LINKABILITY 
TYPE OF  
LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
DEG. ABBR. 
 
0 VA unconditional direct 
LOW 
LEVELS 
1 AA unconditional direct or indirect 
2 RA unconditional or conditional indirect 
HIGH 
LEVELS 
3 FA unconditional or conditional direct or indirect 
4 UA [undecided] void 
2Table 2 – Class-level characterisation of anonymity (cont.) 
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 may either be conditional, unconditional, or void 
Given that the scope of trust plays a central role in our approach, Figure 2 might prove useful for 
promoting better understanding of how the scope boundaries, in particular, evolve from level to 
level. With reference to services ensuring given types of anonymity, columns demarcated by dashed 
lines respectively illustrate (with relatively proportionate heights) the amount of trust that users 
must place in participants. 
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2Figure 2 – Illustration of the scope of trust 
5. CONCLUSION 
Having studied earlier approaches, each of which views anonymity from a different aspect, we can 
safely say that either one is as relevant of its kind as any other. Nevertheless, as the scope of trust 
can certainly be of reasonable concern to the user, we do believe that our categorisation model may 
become, at least, a viable alternative (or complement) to extant schemes of classification. To get a 
bigger picture of the connections between all aforementioned taxonomies, let us take a look at Table 
3. Since, by their very nature, these concepts can seldom be uniquely mapped to each other, we 
cannot generally establish one-to-one correspondences between them. In consequence, most 
mappings shown in Table 3 are rather approximate. It must also be underlined that, as a main 
advantage, our approach not only combines the benefits of the others, but as well remedies their 
deficiencies. Most notably, allowing for a more sophisticated comparison between anonymity 
services, it introduces the concept of forfeitable anonymity. 
Remarks. As for Köhntopp and Pfitzmann’s taxonomy, for simplicity, we confine the examination 
only to publicly observable pseudonyms. Otherwise, most rows should be crammed with additional 
types, which could, in turn, needlessly complicate understanding of relationships. On the other hand, 
parentheses indicate that the given level of anonymity can eliminate the need of using the respective 
pseudonym, however it does not exclude it practically. 
PRESENT FLINN AND MAURER KÖHNTOPP AND PFITZMANN SEYS ET AL. 
void anonymity usual identification 
public 
 pseudonym 
no anonymity or 
 semi-anonymity 
apparent anonymity 
latent identification 
initially non-public 
 pseudonyms 
linkable 
 revocable anonymity 
conditional 
 persistent anonymity 
unlinkable 
 revocable anonymity 
initially non-public 
 transaction pseudonyms  
conditional 
 one-time anonymity 
linkable 
 forfeitable anonymity 
  
30
initially unlinkable 
 pseudonyms 
  
unlinkable 
 forfeitable anonymity 
(initially unlinkable 
 transaction pseudonyms) 
linkable 
 unconditional anonymity 
pen-name or 
 anonymous identification 
initially unlinkable 
 pseudonyms 
unconditional 
 persistent anonymity 
unlinkable 
 unconditional anonymity 
no identification 
(initially unlinkable 
 transaction pseudonyms) 
unconditional 
 one-time anonymity
 
3Table 3 – Correspondences between taxonomies 
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 The use of initially unlinkable pseudonyms, per se, is not sufficient to ensure (linkable) forfeitable anonymity. 
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